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Abstract 
 
Unsafe maintenance in process plants can cause release of dangerous materials, pipe-work 
failure and deviations from normal operations, etc (Hale, et al., 1998). It is reported that 30% 
of accidents are maintenance-related and 50% of them release harmful substances (Wallace 
and Merritt, 2003). Therefore, it is important that systematic hazard identification is carried 
out and precaution is taken before maintenance work commences.  
 
A computer-aided tool is developed as part of the HAZID system (a knowledge based 
software system used to identify hazards by emulating conventional HAZOP study) to help 
the task of identifying hazards related to maintenance work. This tool focuses on safe 
isolation. It serves two functions. One is to suggest an isolation boundary for maintenance. 
Given specific equipment items to be maintained, the system will analyze the process and 
instrumentation diagram (P&ID) to identify the boundary that needs to be closed off for safe 
maintenance. The other function is to identify the potential hazards related to the isolation 
tasks. This paper describes in detail how this tool is developed and a case study is used to 
illustrate how it works.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The safety of hazardous processing plants is of paramount importance as an accident could 
cause major damage to properties and/or injury to people. Well-maintained equipment in the 
process plant can give smooth running of the plant and increase the plant productivity and life 
time. However, the maintenance work of process plant is often dangerous as it requires 
appropriate isolation of the equipment items being maintained. Any release of hazardous 
material can cause damage to the whole plant or even take human life. Therefore, a 
comprehensive identification of potential hazards caused by maintenance work is necessary 
before carrying out the actual maintenance work. 
 
This paper describes a computer-aided tool that considers the safety issues for maintenance 
work in the process plant. It serves two main functions, one is to define an isolation boundary, 
the other is to identify potential hazards related to the isolation task. The tool is newly 
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developed and integrated with the HAZID system, a computer system that helps designers and 
operators of process plants to identify potential design and operation problems given a 
process plant design. 
 
The paper commences by describing the methodology for identifying the isolation boundary 
and how the algorithm is tested.  It then describes how HAZard and OPerability Study 
(HAZOP) analysis is applied to identify hazards after the boundary is identified and selected. 
The details of HAZOP study technique can be found at Crawley et al. (2000) and at Kletz 
(1992). The overall workflow of the tool is then given. The paper ends with a summary of the 
overall methodology. 
 
2. Identifying the isolation boundary 
When equipment items are to be maintained in a process plant, a process engineer will 
analyze the P&ID of that plant, and identify the valves that must be closed in order to isolate 
the equipment items so that they are safe to work on. For example, consider figure 1, if the 
centrifugal pump “P-0101A” is to be maintained, then 5 valves, “V015”, “V002”, “V014”, 
“V013” and “V001”, will need to be closed to isolate the pump. This process of identification 
and the analysis of the potential hazards caused by closing these valves are automated by a 
computer tool and is the subject of the rest of this paper.  
 
2.1 Introducing the plant file 
The plant file, which is a text file generated from the P&ID, describes the equipment items in 
the plant, which includes their connections, flow directions and other attributes. The plant file 
is used as input into the isolation tool. Each valve in the plant file has an attribute called 
“canBeIsolationValve”. This is used to indicate whether the valve can be in general used for 
isolation purpose. The value of the attribute is either “yes” or “no”.  
 
2.2 The tracing procedure 
The procedure for identifying the isolation boundary is to trace upstream and downstream 
from the equipment items to be maintained to find the valves which must be closed. During 
tracing, the tool will only look for the first valve that is isolable in each line branching out 
from the equipment items.  
 
When a Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) is met, the algorithm will compare the direction of the 
tracing and the opening direction of the PRV, if they are in the same direction, then the 
tracing procedure will carry on and the PRV will be identified as within the boundary but 
must be isolated, otherwise, the PRV will be identified as on the boundary and the tracing 
procedure at this branching line ends at this point. 
 
When searching from the equipment items to be maintained, if the propagation passes through 
a sheet connector onto another P&ID then it will continue on the next P&ID until an isolable 
valve is found.  If there is no continuation from the sheet connector, the sheet connector will 
be treated as being on the boundary and the user will be warned that an isolation point has not 
been found for that particular branch. The sheet connector ID or tag number and the pipe 
connected to the sheet connector will be identified in the warning. 
Published in the Proceedings of the 2nd World Conference on Safety of Oil and Gas Industry, Texas, USA, 28-29 Oct 2008, pp. 406-415. 
 3
When multiple items are to be maintained, the same procedure will be applied to all the items. 
The valves that need to be isolated for all the items will be combined together and any 
duplicates are removed.  
 
 
2.3 Testing 
 
Two plants, a hydrocarbon separation unit (Lawley, 1974) and Benzene (Wells and Seagrave, 
1976), are used to test the algorithm. The algorithm correctly identifies the isolation 
boundaries when given different maintenance items as input for the two plants. In order to 
help the user to visualize a boundary the isolation tool automatically highlights the valves to 
be closed on the Smart Plant P&ID CAD system. Figure 1 shows the output for isolating 
pump “P-0101A” for the hydrocarbon separation unit. All the isolable valves are highlighted 
in red. The item to be maintained, “P-0101A”, is highlighted in bright blue. 
 
 
 
   Figure 1. The highlighted isolation boundary for maintaining centrifugal pump “P0101A” 
   
A more sophisticated example is to maintain the liquid-liquid-gas separator in the 
hydrocarbon separation unit plant. Figure 2 shows a table of equipment items on the boundary 
with their current status and related notes. The tool also displays a table with all the items 
within the boundary. Figure 3 shows these items highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID. This 
example shows that several different types of equipment items are on the boundary. The first 
type is the “must be closed” valve, such as “V028”, “V025”,”V021”, “V022”, “V007”, which 
are highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID drawing in red.  The second type is “Pressure Relief 
Published in the Proceedings of the 2nd World Conference on Safety of Oil and Gas Industry, Texas, USA, 28-29 Oct 2008, pp. 406-415. 
 4
Valve (PRV)”, such as “PRV002PRV”, “PRV001PRV”. The third type is the “Off Page 
Connector (OPC)”. The second and third types are highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID drawing 
in purple.  The items to be maintained are highlighted in bright blue.  (Because the 
proceedings is printed in black & white, so dashed rectangle boxes are put around isolation 
valves and rhombic boxes are put around OPCs and PRVs) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Items on the isolation boundary for maintaining separator “T0100” 
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Figure 3. The highlighted isolation boundary for maintaining separator “T-0100” 
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3. Identifying hazard after the isolation boundary is defined 
Once the boundary is identified a HAZOP analysis has to be carried out to identify the 
hazards related to the isolation procedure. Hazid, a knowledge-based system which 
automates the process of HAZOP studies, is used for this purpose. HAZID system is 
developed by Hazid Technologies Ltd. and is currently the most advanced commercially 
available knowledge-based HAZOP tool. (Hazid Technology. Ltd, 2007). The 
development of HAZID is given by Rushton et al. (1998) and by McCoy et al. (1999a, 
1999b, 1999c). There are other HAZOP automation systems for research purpose that can 
be found at Bartolozzi et al. (2000) and at Vanathan and  Venkatasubramanian (1995). 
 
After the items on the boundary are identified, the user is asked to review the items and 
specify the order in which they should be closed. Consider the example shown in figure 
1, if the first item selected to be closed is “V001” then a HAZOP analysis is carried out 
by applying the deviation 'no flow' to V001. This is done by the isolation tool by 
invoking HAZID to carry out an analysis to identify the hazards that might be introduced 
by this deviation. If hazards are identified then they are reported. If no hazard is 
identified then the tool will go on to consider the deviation 'no flow' for the second 
boundary item to be closed (e.g. “V002”) and with “V001” being closed. This process 
goes on until the closing of all the valves on the boundary have been considered. In this 
way, there will be many HAZOP results as the valves are being closed in sequence. The 
HAZOP analyses carried out in HAZID are produced quickly and the successive analyses 
occupy little user time. Table 1 illustrates this hazard identification process. Presentation 
of the results is shown in HMeeting, a tool to view HAZOP analysis results in HAZID. 
The presentation of the results will highlight the differences of the results, so that the 
engineer can focus on the hazards that might be aroused by closing a valve.  
 
Conditions Actions Result 
“no flow” passing through 
V001 (this should be the 
original HAZOP result 
with only “no flow” being 
considered) 
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result1 
“no flow” passing through 
V002 + V001 closed 
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result2 
“no flow” passing through 
V003 + V002 closed 
+V001 closed  
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result3 
............................ ………………….. …………………. 
“no flow” passing through 
VN + VN-1 closed + VN-2 
closed …+V001 closed  
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result n 
 
Table 1. The hazard identification process 
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4. The Overall Workflow 
Figure 4 shows the overall workflow of the Isolation Tool. It starts with loading the 
original plant file as input, and then a list of frames is generated in which each frame 
describes the information of an equipment item. After allowing the user to specify the 
item to be maintained, the tool will run its algorithm to look for the items including 
valves, OPCs without continuations, and PRVs in the isolation boundary and then display 
them. Then it will move onto the second stage which is to identify the hazards after the 
boundary is defined.  It starts by allowing the user to specify the sequence for closing the 
valves on the boundary. Then it generates a series of input files for HAZID with each 
valve is closed in each stage of the sequence as described in table1. HAZID is then called 
to do a HAZOP analysis with only “no flow” being considered for each input file. The 
results are then automatically compared and any differences are highlighted to show any 
hazards related to closing any of the valves.  
 
5. Further development 
Although the current tool is sufficient to carry out hazard identification before 
commencing the real maintenance tasks, further improvement is ongoing to enhance its 
usability and acceptability.  For example, it is being considered to extend the current tool 
to do a maintenance analysis by keeping the history of maintenance activity, setting a 
time condition when multiple items are to be maintained, etc. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Carry out maintenance safely is of paramount importance to avoid releasing hazardous 
material into the atmosphere and to prevent maintenance related accidents. A thorough 
hazard analysis ahead of the actual work is more likely to give a successful and safe 
maintenance implementation.  
 
Although process plant P&IDs are already available electronically for process engineers 
to identify potential hazards, no computer-aided tool was used to help with defining an 
isolation boundary for the maintenance work and calling the hazard identification 
analysis automatically from the maintenance safety point of view.  
 
This paper describes a novel computer-aided tool to help with safe isolation for 
maintenance work. In order to define the isolation boundary, the tool searches upstream 
and downstream of the item to be maintained to find the isolable valves which must be 
closed . After the boundary is defined, HAZOP analysis with deviation “no flow” is 
applied to identify hazards that may arise when the valves are closed in a specified order.  
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              Figure 4. Working flow of the Isolation Tool 
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Isolation tool: Loading the plant file  
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each frame describes the 
information of an 
equipment item 
Isolation tool: Looking for valves for defining 
the isolation boundary after allowing the user 
to specify the items to be maintained 
Isolation boundary 
Isolation tool: Allowing the user to specify 
closing sequence of valves in the boundary 
Isolation tool: Generating new PL file 
for each valve to be closed 
Closing sequence of 
valves in the boundary 
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HAZOP result
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results 
  End 
New PL files 
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